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PLACE YOUR BETS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RIVERBOAT
GAMBLING ACTS: DO THEY VIOLATE
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE?
"Once again, a little fish has caused a commotion." ' The fish
in this case is a riverboat casino. The prospect of increased
revenue prompted several states to legalize gambling in a limited
form on riverboats. 2 Illinois,3 Indiana,4 Iowa,5 Louisiana, 6 Mis-
sissippi, 7 and Missouri each enacted riverboat gambling acts,
and many other states are seriously considering similar legisla-
tion.9 Competition in the riverboat casino industry is fierce
1. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 132 (1986) (noting the recurrence of
dormant Commerce Clause analysis of state statutes interfering with interstate
shipments of minnows). See infra note 12 (defining the dormant Commerce
Clause).
2. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law - Update 1993, 15 HASTINGS
Comm. & ENT. L.J. 93, 99 (1993).
3. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 §§ 1-23 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("Riv-
erboat Gambling Act").
4. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-33-1-1 to 4-33-15-4 (Bums Supp. 1994) ("Riv-
erboat Gambling").
5. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 99F.1-99F.18 (West Supp. 1994) ("Excursion Boat
Gambling").
6. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:501-4:562 (West Supp. 1994) ("Louisiana
Riverboat Economic Development and Gaming Control Act").
7. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-76-1 to 75-76-313 (1991 & Supp. 1993) ("Mis-
sissippi Gaming Control Act" permitting gambling on "vessels"). See Op.
Att'y Gen. (Miss. July 19, 1991), n.l.
8. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 313.800-313.850 (Supp. 1993) ("Excursion Gam-
bling Boats"). But see Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58,
62, 64 (Mo. 1994) (en banc) (holding Missouri's riverboat gambling act invalid,
in part, on grounds that it was passed in violation of Missouri's Constitution
which requires a state constitutional amendment to legalize any lotteries because
games of chance fit within the definition of lotteries).
9. See James Ragland & Liz Spayd, D.C. Considering Casino Gambling,
WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 20, 1993, at Al (describing the interest of Maryland,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia in riverboat gambling); John F. Harris,
Virginia Legislative Panel Wants to Clear the Decks for Riverboat Gambling,
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 20, 1993, at A5; Inside Talk - Rolling (dice) on the
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among the states, 0 the operators, and the private parties seeking
licenses to operate the casinos. The Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution" may be just the check needed to
keep the competition fair.
Riverboat gambling acts raise two types of dormant Commerce
Clause 12 issues. First, a state-licensed riverboat casino may vio-
late a neighboring state's gambling laws by crossing into that
state's territorial waters, 3 even if riverboat gambling is legal in
the neighboring state. 4 Second, the present riverboat gambling
acts include licensing requirements that promote in-state eco-
nomic interests, and impede out-of-state operators' attempts to
obtain licenses to operate legally in the state's waters. 15 This
Note addresses the dormant Commerce Clause issues raised by
existing riverboat gambling acts 6 and concludes with a proposed
River, STAR TRm., Sept. 9, 1991, at 3B (Minnesota); NY City Ponders
Riverboat Gambling, N.Y. Thms (J. oF COMMERCE), Aug. 26, 1991, at BI;
Riverboat Gambling Coming to Winona?, SUCCESSFUL Bus., Mar. 16, 1992,
at 5 (Minnesota).
10. Patrick T. Reardon, States Betting on Riverboat War, CHICAGO TRm.,
July 2, 1993, at 1.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "Although the Clause thus speaks in
terms of powers, bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that
it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade."
Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980). This limitation on
the states in areas where Congress has not affirmatively acted to either
authorize or forbid the challenged state activity is called the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1987).
13. See, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. 92-001 (Ark. Jan. 27, 1992) ("If a casino
riverboat crosses into Arkansas waters while the gambling activity is occurring,
it will be in violation of Arkansas law and subject to prosecution."); Op.
Att'y Gen. 38-90 (Wis. Dec. 28, 1990) ("Should an Iowa licensed riverboat
enter Wisconsin water while its 'gambling games' are in play, this would
constitute a violation of [Wisconsin's criminal gambling statutes] by the
operator as well as the employes [sic] and patrons of the riverboat."); see
also infra part II.B (discussing problems associated with concurrent jurisdiction
on interstate waterways).
14. An operator must be licensed by the state to lawfully operate a casino
or even carry gambling equipment into the state. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
230, para. 10 § 20 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-1 (Burns
Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.15.1.a (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 4:502.A(4) (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-55
(1991 & Supp. 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.830 (Supp. 1993).
15. For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see infra text accom-
panying notes 28-39.
16. In addition to Commerce Clause challenges, riverboat gambling acts
may be subject to challenges based on, inter alia, laws prohibiting restraints
of trade and the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV, Section 2https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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Model Riverboat Gambling Act designed to avoid Commerce
Clause violations. 17 The proposed Model Act includes licensing
requirements that achieve local purposes of promoting in-state
economic interests and ensuring close regulation of riverboat
gambling without discriminating against out-of-state operators.
Part I of this Note details problems the riverboat gambling
acts raise for casino operators seeking to conduct gambling in
interstate waters and discusses jurisdictional issues that arise
when riverboat casinos cross state borders. Part II of this Note
highlights several points in the development of dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, focusing on issues particularly relevant
to existing riverboat gambling acts. Part II also includes a
statement of the combined test for dormant Commerce Clause
analysis of the acts. Part II concludes with a discussion of
National Association of Fundraising Ticket Manufacturers v.
Humphrey, 8 a Minnesota Federal District Court opinion that
serves as an example of modern Commerce Clause analysis as
it applies to state gambling regulations. Part III concludes that
riverboat gambling acts are subject to constitutional scrutiny
and that riverboat gambling is a subject of interstate commerce.
Part III then applies the test articulated in Part II to several
barriers to multistate operation of riverboat casinos. Finally,
Part IV presents a proposed Model Riverboat Gambling Act
that avoids discriminating against out-of-state operators while
still promoting a state's own economic interests and protecting
the state's public welfare.
I. THE PROBLEMS
A. Impediments to Multi-State Licensing of Riverboat
Casinos
A riverboat casino operator must surmount a number of legal
and financial obstacles before operating the casino in more than
one state. Although state legislators commonly argue that le-
galizing riverboat gambling will promote state tourism, state
government's ultimate purpose is to earn revenue. 9 To collect
and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (invalidating state fishing regulations because
they violated both the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause). Consideration of such additional challenges, however, is beyond the
scope of this Note.
17. See infra part IV.
18. 753 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Minn. 1990).
19. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 2(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("This
Act is intended to benefit the people of the State of Illinois by assisting
1995]
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revenue, states impose licensing fees that can cost up to $50,000,20
taxes on riverboat operators' revenue of up to 20% of adjusted
gross receipts, 21 and admission fees of up to $3.00 per passenger,
regardless of whether the passenger gambles3n Riverboat gain-
economic development and promoting Illinois tourism."); Transcript of debate
on Illinois Senate Bill 572, H.R. 89 (June 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Giorgi)
(enumerating benefits of riverboat gambling including, inter alia, spurring
economic development, creating jobs, boosting tourism, revitalizing rivers, and
beautifying riverfronts); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1994)
(explaining legislative intent); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 4:502.A(1) (West 1992)
(explaining public policy behind the state's development of riverboat gambling
industry); Barbara Powell, The New Era of Riverboat Gambling, 36 FED. BAR
NEws & J. 395, 395 (1989) (discussing Iowa legislature's hope that riverboat
gambling will boost tourism and help state's economy recover from farm
crisis); see also infra note 80 (discussing the difficulties in determining true
legislative purposes behind statutes and the relevance of legislative purposes
to dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
20. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 §§ 6(d), 7(a), 10 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(charging $50,000 application fee for background investigation, $25,000 non-
refundable license fee, $5,000 annual license renewal fee, and requiring the
licensee to post a $200,000 bond); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-33-6-8(1), (2), 4-33-
6-9 (Burns Supp. 1994) (requiring a $25,000 licensing fee for first year, $5,000
annual license renewal fee, and a bond); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 99F.5.2, 99F.8
(West Supp. 1994) (charging annual license fee based on calculation of $5 per
person multiplied by the capacity of the riverboat and requiring a bond); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:550.B(l), (2) (West 1994) (charging licensing fees of
$50,000 for first year, $100,000 for each year thereafter, plus 3.5(1 of net
gaming proceeds); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-76-177, 75-76-183, 75-76-191 (1991
& Supp. 1993) (charging $5,000 application fee and a $5,000 annual license
fee, plus additional license fees according to a schedule based on the number
of games operated in the casino, plus an additional license fee, in lieu of a
tax, based on gross revenues of licensee according to a graduated percentage
schedule); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 313.807, 313.815 (Supp. 1993) (requiring non-
refundable licensing fee of the greater of $50,000 or $15,000 for each person
to be investigated for the license, additional fees the gaming commission deems
appropriate if the cost of the investigation exceeds the initial licensing fee, an
annual renewal fee to be set by the gaming commission at a minimum of
$25,000, and a bond). For a discussion of calculating state taxes, see infra
note 21.
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 13(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (20%
tax on adjusted gross receipts); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-13-1(a) (Burns Supp.
1994) (20% tax on adjusted gross receipts); IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.11 (West
Supp. 1994) (5% tax on first $1 million of adjusted gross receipts, 10% tax
on next $2 million, and 20% tax on adjusted gross receipts over $3 million);
Miss. CODE Ar. § 75-76-177(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993) (4% license fee on all
gross revenue for first $50,000 per month, 6% license fee on next $84,000 per
month, and 8% license fee on monthly gross revenue over $134,000); Mo.
Ruv. STAT. § 313.822 (Supp. 1993) (20% tax on adjusted gross receipts).
'Adjusted gross receipts' means the [total sums wagered] on the riverboat
less winnings paid to wagerers." IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.1.1, .11 (West Supp.
1994). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 4(g) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(defining gross receipts as "the total amount of money exchanged for the
purchase of chips, tokens or electronic cards by riverboat patrons").
22. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 12(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ($2 perhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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bling states are cashing in on this new industry in a frenzy
reminiscent of the boom in dram shops following the end of
prohibition.23
While the cost of multistate licensing is steep, the penalties
for operating a casino without a proper license are even steeper.
For example, an operator who crosses into the waters of a
neighboring state risks forfeiture of adjusted gross receipts,
gambling equipment, and even the vessel itself. A riverboat
operator also risks criminal prosecution for operating a gambling
establishment in violation of the neighboring state's gambling
laws.24 Furthermore, an operator may face federal prosecution
person); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-12-1 (Burns Supp. 1994) ($3 per person);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.10.2 (West Supp. 1994) (admission fee set by Iowa's
state racing and gaming commission); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:552.A (West
Supp. 1994) (up to $2.50 per person); Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.820.1 (Supp.
1993) ($2 per person).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1 (repealing prohibition). See Rose, supra
note 2, at 99-100 (discussing the likelihood of rapid saturation of the legalized
gambling market based on a comparison to the end of prohibition).
24. State statutes enumerate penalties for violating state gambling laws,
including, inter alia, fines, seizure and destruction of gambling equipment,
forfeiture of gambling establishment, and imprisonment. See ALA. CODE § 13A-
12-30 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.66.200-.66.280 (1989); Aiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3310(A)(2) (1989); Aix. CODE AN. § 5-66-107 (Michie 1993); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 330 (West 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-10-101, 18-10-
104 (1990); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANNS. § 53-278c(a) (West 1985); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1405 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1505(c) (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 849.232 (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-30 (1992); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 712-1220 to -1231 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-3804
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5 § 28-5 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-45-5-3 to -4 (Burns 1994) (IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-10 (Burns
1994) (exempts riverboat gambling authorized by § 4-33)); IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 725.5, 725.8 (West 1993); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. §§ 21-4304, 4305, 4307
(Vernon Supp. 1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.100 (Baldwin 1993); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:31 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A § 956
(West 1983); MD. CODE ANN., Cimu. LAW §§ 246A, 264 (1988); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 271, § 5A (Law. Co-op. 1990); MicH. Corm,. LAWS ANNr. § 750.308
(West Supp. 1994); MnNr. STAT. ANN. § 609.762 (West 1987); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-33-17 (Supp. 1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 572.120 (1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 23-5-152, -161, -162 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1111 (1989); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 179.1165, 465.088, 465.100 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 647:2 (1986 & Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:37-4 (West 1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-19-10, -15 (Michie 1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 225.30 (McKinney
1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-298 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-28-02(4)(c)
(Supp. 1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2915.03(B) (Anderson 1993); OKIA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 960 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 167.162 (1990); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5513(b) (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-19-24, 11-19-
26, 11-19-28 (1981 & Supp. 1993); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-19-80, 16-19-120
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFImD LAWS ANN. § 22-25-1 (1988); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 38-6-11, 39-11-116, 39-17-505 (1991 & Supp. 1994); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 47.04 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1107, 76-10-1108 (1990);
1995]
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for unlawful transportation of gambling equipment, 5 or for
operating an illegal gambling business. 26 These risks to riverboat
operators increase in some instances because riverboat casinos
cruise on waterways so narrow that riverboats inevitably cross
into a neighboring state's waters. 27
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2137, 2138 (1974 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-336 (Michie 1988); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.46.230 (West 1988);
W.VA. CODE § 61-10-1 (1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 945.03 (West 1982); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-7-103 (1988). See generally State v. Gambling Equip., 40 P.2d 746,
747 (Ariz. 1935) (recognizing destruction of illegal gambling equipment as
within state police powers).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1172.
It shall be unlawful knowingly to transport any gambling device
to any place in a State or a possession of the United States from
any place outside of such state or possession: Provided, That this
section shall not apply to transportation of any gambling device
to a place in any State which has enacted a law providing for the
exemption of such State from the provisions of this section, or to
a place in any subdivision of a State if the State in which such
subdivision is located has enacted a law providing for the exemp-
tion of such subdivision from the provisions of this section, nor
shall this section apply to any gambling device used or designed
for use at and transported to licensed gambling establishments
where betting is legal under applicable State laws: Provided further,
That it shall not be unlawful to transport in interstate or foreign
commerce any gambling device into any State in which the trans-
ported gambling device is specifically enumerated as lawful in a
statute of that State.
15 U.S.C. § 1172(a) (Supp. V 1993). When Section 1172 was first enacted,
the statute applied even in states that permitted gambling, unless the state
gambling statute expressly provided an exemption from the federal statute.
See North Beach Amusement Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 729, 731 (4th
Cir. 1957) (refusing to find an exemption where state statute made no reference
to Section 1172 of the Johnson Act); United States v. Two Hollycrane Slot
Machines, 136 F. Supp. 550, 551 (D. Mass. 1955) (holding that Massachusetts
did not have a Section 1172 exemption, since it would have been so easy to
explicitly enact such an exemption). Although a subsequent amendment to
Section 1172 did away with requiring explicit exemptions in state statutes,
some riverboat gambling states still provide Section 1172 exemptions explicitly
in their riverboat gambling acts. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:667 (West
Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-59 (1993).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988). Section 1955(b)(1)(i) requires a business
to be "a gambling business which is a violation of the law of a State... in
which it is conducted" before it can be found to be an "illegal gambling
business." Id. (emphasis added). In Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 132-33,
the defendant challenged a conviction for violating and conspiring to violate
the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988), making it a federal crime to
"import, export, transport ... any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, trans-
ported, or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State." 16 U.S.C.
§ 3372(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). A Maine statute prohibited importing live
baitfish. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133 n.1 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 12,
§ 7613 (1981)).
27. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 19, at 398 (explaining that the Mississippihttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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States also impede multistate operation by requiring riverboat
casino operators to comply with licensing requirements designed
to promote in-state economic interests. 2s Iowa's act, for example,
requires "that a substantial amount of all resources and goods
used in the operation of an excursion gambling boat come from
Iowa." 29 Iowa's act further requires that "a substantial amount
of all services and entertainment be provided by Iowans." 30
Missouri's act had a similar requirement.3 1 Mississippi requires
employment of Mississippi residents as gaming employees and
other employees in riverboat casino operations "to the extent
practicable. "32 Louisiana requires operators to preferentially treat
Louisiana firms when they seek resources, goods, services, and
entertainment for riverboat casinos "to the extent allowable by
law.", 33
River is so narrow at some points between Iowa and Illinois "it would be
impossible for Iowa gambling boats not to cross into Illinois territory").
28. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 7(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd
1993) (requiring Gaming Board to consider potential state revenue when
deciding whether to grant a license); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-6-4(3) (Bums
Supp. 1994) (same).
29. IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.4 (West Supp. 1994). Iowa also requires
that the riverboat casino has a gift shop selling "arts, crafts, and gifts native
to and made in Iowa." IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.5.d (West Supp. 1994). Cf.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.812.5 (Supp. 1993) (requiring a "Missouri theme gift
shop").
30. IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.4 (West Supp. 1994).
31. In 1992, Missouri adopted a riverboat gambling act requiring the state
gambling commission to
require that an applicant [for a license] use Missouri resources,
goods, and services in the operation of an excursion gambling
boat where feasible and obtainable ... [and requiring the com-
mission to] develop standards to assure that a substantial amount
of all resources and goods used in the operation ... come from
Missouri and that a substantial number of the staff and entertainers
employed are Missouri residents.
L. 1991, H.B. 149 § 6.4 (reprinted in Mo. ANN. STAT. § 572.010 (Vernon
Supp. 1993). This section has been repealed. S.B. 10 & 11, 87th Gen. Assembly
(1993). The new act provides that "[tihe commission shall encourage through
its rules and regulations the use of Missouri resources, goods and services in
the operation of any excursion gambling boat." Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.812.4
(Supp. 1993). See also Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 864 S.W.2d 58,
61 (Mo. 1994) (explaining that S.B. 10 & 11 deleted the requirement that
riverboat operators use Missouri resources, goods, services, and employees).
32. Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-3(4) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
33. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 4:511(2)(g) (West Supp. 1994). Cf. Davis v.
Davis, 452 F. Supp. 44, 47 (D. Pa. 1978) (applying Pennsylvania long arm
statute, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8309(b), authorizing in personam juris-
diction over foreign corporations "to the fullest extent allowable under the
Constitution"); Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 585
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (interpreting Florida's obscenity statute as intending to regulate
1995]
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Riverboat gambling states impose additional requirements that
further disadvantage out-of-state operators. For example, Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri require licensed riv-
erboats to be replicas of nineteenth century riverboats of their
home state.3 4 Moreover, each riverboat gambling state requires
operators to acquire all gambling equipment through suppliers
licensed by that state.35 Other conflicts between the existing acts
include wager and loss limits,36 dock-side gambling privileges,37
obscenity to maximum extent allowed by the Constitution), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 659 (1992).
34. IND. CODE AN. § 4-33-6-6(b) (Burns Supp. 1994) (requiring riverboats
to "replicate, as nearly as possible, historic Indiana steamboat passenger
vessels of the nineteenth century"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.3 (West Supp.
1994) (requiring riverboats to resemble Iowa's riverboat history as nearly as
practicable); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:504(23)(d) (West Supp. 1994) (defining
riverboat as a vessel that replicates, "as nearly as practicable historic Louisiana
[riverboats]"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.812.3 (Supp. 1993) (requiring riverboats
to resemble Missouri's riverboat history as nearly as practicable, unless the
boat is continuously docked in an exempted zone). Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
230, para. 10 § 6(f) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring a riverboat used in a
gambling operation to be "either a replica of a 19th century Illinois riverboat
or of a casino cruise ship design"). But see Harris, 869 S.W.2d at 66 (ordering
Missouri Gaming Commission to show a substantial justification for treating
certain St. Louis boats, that are exempt from the Missouri riverboat history
design requirement, differently from all other boats regarding their appear-
ance).
35. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 8(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-8 (Burns Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.17.2 (West
Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:525.B(4) (West Supp. 1994); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-76-79 (1991 & Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 572.010
(Vernon Supp. 1993), L. 1991, H.B. 149, § 4(4), repealed and amended by
S.B. 10 & 11 (codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.807.3 (Supp. 1993)).
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 11(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (no
wager or loss limits, but licensees must set minimum and maximum wagers
on games); INrD. CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-4 (Burns Supp. 1994) (no wager or loss
limits, but licensees determine minimum and maximum wagers); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 99F.4.4, 99F.9.2 (West Supp. 1994) (maximum wager of five dollars
per hand and a maximum loss limit of two hundred dollars per person per
excursion); Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.805(3) (Supp. 1993) (maximum loss of five
hundred dollars per individual player per gambling excursion).
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 11(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(prohibiting dock-side gambling); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-2 (Burns Supp.
1994) (prohibiting dock-side gambling except for periods up to thirty minutes
during passenger embarkation and disembarkation or when weather or water
conditions present danger); IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.9.7 (West Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting dock-side gambling except when the riverboat is temporarily
docked for mechanical problems, adverse weather, or water conditions, or
during off season); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:525.B(1)(a) (West Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting dock-side gambling except when docked for less than forty-five
minutes or when weather or water conditions present danger); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 313.805(15) (Supp. 1993) (prohibiting dock-side gambling unless permanentlyhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/is 1/4
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minimum age limits, 38 and permissible locations for exchange
booths to comply with each state's cashless wagering system
requirement.3 9 As a result of these conflicts between state gam-
bling statutes, no riverboat casino has been licensed to operate
in more than one state.
B. Riverboat Gambling States and Concurrent Jurisdiction
Despite all the impediments to multistate licensing of riverboat
casinos discussed above, many licensed operators want to con-
duct gambling in adjoining states' waters. If operators do con-
duct gambling in more than one state, a jurisdictional issue
arises: can operating a riverboat casino in an open, interstate
waterway that borders two states be perfectly legal on the side
of the waterway that borders the riverboat gambling state, and
criminal on the side that borders the non-riverboat gambling
state?
Upon admitting states into the Union, Congress granted them
concurrent jurisdiction over criminal acts committed on portions
of interstate waterways bordering two states. 4° Where an act on
docked between specified points on Mississippi Riverfront). But see Harris,
869 S.W.2d at 66 (requiring a substantial justification for the special exception).
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 11(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(employees may be 18 and older, but no employee under 21 may perform any
gambling function; no one else under 21 is permitted in a gambling area);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-33-9-12, -13 (Bums Supp. 1994) (employees may be 18
and older, but no employee under 21 may perform any gambling function;
no one else under 21 is permitted in a gambling area); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 99F.9.6 (West Supp. 1994) (18 or older to gamble); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:525.B(a) (West Supp. 1994) (no one under 21 is permitted in a gambling
area); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-155 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (no one under 21
is permitted); Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.817.4 (Supp. 1993) (employees may be
18 and older, but no one under 21 may serve as a dealer or accept wagers;
no one else under 21 is permitted in a gambling area).
39. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 11(a)(12) (Smith-Hurd 1993)(exchange center may be located aboard the riverboat or at an approved
onshore facility); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-15 (Burns Supp. 1994) (exchange
center may be located on board or at approved on-shore facility where the
riverboat docks); IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.4.14 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring
cashless wagering system without specifying exchange location); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 4:525.B(11) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring tokens, chips, or
electronic cards to be purchased aboard the riverboat); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-
76-101 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (requiring cashless wagering system without
specifying location); Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.817.3 (Supp. 1993) (requiring
cashless wagering system without specifying exchange location).
40. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 6, 1846, ch. 89, 9 Stat. 56, 57 (admitting
Wisconsin to the Union). Congress also granted states concurrent jurisdiction
over civil actions. However, state jurisdiction over civil actions arising out of
events in a riverboat casino is potentially limited. Article III, Section 2 of the
U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1988) grant exclusive federal
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a waterway is malum in se, "a wrong in itself, '41 concurrent
jurisdiction gives primary jurisdiction over defendants to the
first state to assert jurisdiction. 42 This avoids double jeopardy
by prohibiting prosecution in two states for the same offense.43
However, concurrent jurisdiction is not guaranteed where an act
is merely malum prohibitum, not inherently bad but wrong
because it is prohibited by law." When an activity such as
operating a riverboat casino is prohibited by one state's laws,
but authorized and even licensed by another state, the Supreme
Court has held that criminal jurisdiction only extends to each
state's border. 45
When one considers the impediments to multistate licensing,
the jurisdictional issue arises even where two riverboat gambling
states border the waterway. One riverboat gambling commen-
tator, Barbara Powell,46 hypothesized that because Iowa and
Illinois legalized riverboat gambling on the Mississippi River "a
person could gamble freely" on the river between the two
states.47 According to Powell, the concurrent jurisdiction prob-
lem arises only when one state legalizes riverboat gambling and
another does not.48 Powell oversimplified the issue of concurrent
jirisdiction. Riverboat gambling is still malum prohibitum when
the operator is not licensed, even in a riverboat gambling state. 49
Because unlicensed gambling is malum prohibitum, concurrent
jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases. To invoke federal admiralty
jurisdiction under § 1333(1), two elements must be met. First, events giving
rise to the civil action must occur on the navigable waters of the United
States, and second, the events must have a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. Id. See generally Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972) (requiring a tort to bear a "significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity" for a federal court to invoke its
admiralty jurisdiction over the case). It is unclear whether a court would find
that a civil action arising out of events in a riverboat casino bears a significant
relationship to traditional maritime activity.
41. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 320 (1909); Op. Att'y Gen. 38-90
(Wis. Dec. 28, 1990).
43. See Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 320.
44. BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 960 (6th ed. 1990).
45. Nielsen, 212 U.S. at 321. See also Op. Att'y Gen. 38-90 (Wis. Dec.
28, 1990) (concluding that gambling is malum prohibilum on the Mississippi
River in Wisconsin water, despite the fact that gambling is legalized in Iowa).
46. Barbara Powell is a partner with the law firm of Thompson and
Mitchell and is a former Assistant General Counsel with the Maritime Ad-
ministration. Powell, supra note 19, at 395, 395 n.*.
47. Id. at 397.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (listing riverboat gambling
states' requirements for operators to have licenses to operate casinos).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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jurisdiction does not apply. A riverboat gambling state still has
criminal jurisdiction over nonlicensed operators within that state's
borders.50
II. INTRODUCTION TO DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
A. Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Riverboat gambling acts are designed to promote in-state
economic interests. Consequently, licensing requirements usually
result in the exclusion of out-of-state operators. Such discrimi-
nation against out-of-state operators makes riverboat gambling
acts immediately suspect under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution." The framers of the Constitution
drafted the Commerce Clause in response to post-Revolutionary
War competition between the states. 52 In fact, "tendencies to-
ward economic Balkanization," including mounting interstate
tariff wars, influenced the framers' decision to call the Consti-
tutional Convention. 3 The framers intended the Commerce Clause
to prevent conflicting regulation at state borders, protect the
free flow of interstate trade, and generally promote interstate
comity and cooperation in the interest of Union solidarity.5 4 In
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing criminal sanctions
for violating a state's gambling laws).
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). H.P.
Hood & Sons involved a challenge to New York's denial of a license to an
out-of-state business on the grounds that it would promote the local economy.
Id. at 526. The Court stated that "[t]he sole purpose for which Virginia
initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution was to
consider how uniform regulation of commerce might promote national inter-
ests." Id. at 533.
53. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (citing H.P. Hood
& Sons, 336 U.S. at 533-34). The defendant in Hughes challenged an Oklahoma
statute prohibiting export of minnows. Id. at 323. The Court explained that
the Commerce Clause reflects one of the framers' central concerns. Id. at 325.
54. See generally H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533-34 (discussing the
adoption of the Commerce Clause); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 522 (1935) (attributing the Commerce Clause to interstate tariffs and
retaliation); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 153 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that when a state must justify an action burdening interstate commerce
by showing a legitimate local purpose and a lack of nondiscriminatory alter-
natives, the state should not pursue its legitimate interest in a manner "of-
fensive to the notions of comity and cooperation underlying the Commerce
Clause").
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1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden,55 Chief Justice Marshall provided
the Commerce Clause with much of its present force by inter-
preting the phrase "among the several states" to include a
federal power to regulate commerce not only on the jurisdic-
tional boundary lines of the states, but also within the territories
of the states. 6 Gibbons supplemented Congress' power to uni-
formly regulate interstate commerce by giving the Supreme Court
an unprecedented power to put limits on state authority.57
Commerce Clause review of state actions in the absence of
federal congressional regulation was the dawn of what is cur-
rently known as dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 8 In Will-
son v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 59 the Marshall Court
reviewed a challenge to Delaware's authorization for a company
to construct a dam across a navigable creek. The Court reasoned
that in the absence of a congressional act controlling state
legislation over intrastate navigable waterways, Delaware's au-
thorization would violate the Commerce Clause "in its dormant
state" if the authorization burdened interstate commerce. 60 The
Court determined that Delaware's authorization did not burden
interstate commerce because there were many alternate water-
ways in Delaware.6 Thus, the Court refused to find a Commerce
Clause violation.
In contrast to the Marshall Court, the Court under Chief
Justice Taney took a categorical approach to dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 62 The Court analyzed a statute challenged on
55. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
56. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194. Gibbons involved a challenge to
New York's grant of an exclusive right to operate steamboats in New York
waters despite a congressional act regulating the licensing of vessels.
57. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMmERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WArrE 18-19 (1937) (stating that Marshall's doctrine that the Court had
power to "place limits on state authority" was "an audacious doctrine," even
though it furthered national interests).
58. See supra note 12 (defining the dormant Commerce Clause).
59. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
60. Id. at 252. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall stated that,
absent a conflict with federal legislation, "[tihe repugnancy of the law ...
to the constitution is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states . . ." Id.
61. Id. The Court concluded that "under the circumstances of the case,"
Delaware's action was not repugnant to the Commerce Clause. The act
incorporating the company recognized that the creek in question was one of
many similar waterways. Id. at 251.
62. The Marshall Court resisted dividing state actions into either police
power or commerce power activities. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 57, at 30-
31. Marshall may even have recognized the paramount importance of the
effect of state action, even though he deferred to the state's police power in
Willson. Id. at 27-31. See supra notes 59-61 (discussing Willson).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_ rbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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Commerce Clause grounds by fitting the statute into one of two
categories: A valid exercise of the state's police power, or an
invalid attempt to regulate commerce. 63 For example, in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens," the Court upheld a Philadelphia law
requiring owners of vessels to pay a piloting fee and allow a
local pilot to maneuver the vessels while in the harbor.65 The
Court reasoned that the law was constitutional because, on its
face, it was a valid exercise of the police power. 6
In 1951, the Court in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison67 questioned
the Taney Court's categorical approach and injected into Com-
merce Clause analysis the question of whether the state could
achieve police power objectives by less discriminatory alterna-
tives. The Dean Milk Court found that an ordinance requiring
that milk be pasteurized and bottled within a five mile radius
of the center of the city violated the Commerce Clause.6 The
Court invalidated the ordinance, despite its public health pur-
pose, because "reasonable and adequate" alternatives were avail-
able that did not discriminate against out-of-state milk
producers. 69 The Court reasoned that upholding a state action
because it professed to be a health regulation would leave the
Commerce Clause unable to limit state action except "for the
rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose
to discriminate against interstate goods.' '70 The existence of less
discriminatory alternatives thus became an important part of
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.71
Since 1950, the Supreme Court has attempted to formulate a
workable dormant Commerce Clause test. 72 The test courts apply
63. See LAURENCE H. TRna, A PicAuN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 407 (2d ed.
1988) (explaining the Court's approach of characterizing a state regulation as
local or national in character to determine whether the regulation violated the
Commerce Clause).
64. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
65. Id. at 321.
66. See id. at 325-26 (Daniel, J., concurring). Cf. Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding a New York law requiring
incoming passenger ships to provide detailed information about all passengers
on grounds that the statute protected public health).
67. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
68. Id. at 356.
69. Id. at 354-56.
70. Id. at 354.
71. See infra text accompanying note 75 (describing part of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis).
72. See generally Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Hughes v. Okla-
homa, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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today provides two standards for review. The Pike v. Bruce
Church?3 standard applies when a challenged state action only
incidentally burdens interstate commerce. However, when a chal-
lenged state action discriminates on its face or in its practical
effect, the heightened scrutiny standard from Hughes v. Okla-
homa applies.74
The test for the dormant Commerce Clause analysis of the
riverboat gambling acts performed in Part III of this Note can
be summarized as follows:
Step 1. Determine whether the state action's burden on inter-
state commerce is merely incidental, or whether the state action
discriminates against out-of-state operators either on its face or
in its practical effect.
Step 2. If the burden is merely incidental, the state action
does not violate the Commerce Clause unless the burden is
clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits of the action.
If nondiscriminatory alternatives to achieve the same local ben-
efits exist, the burden on interstate commerce is presumptively
much greater than when no such alternatives exist.
Step 3. If the state action discriminates against out-of-state
operators on its face or in its practical effect, the action violates
the Commerce Clause unless: (a) the statute serves a legitimate
local purpose; and (b) the purpose could not be achieved through
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 75
73. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). In Pike, the Court held that an evenhanded state
statute only violates the Commerce Clause if the statute's burden on interstate
commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
at 142. If a statute regulates evenhandedly (as between in-state and out-of-
state parties or articles of commerce), usually the burden of the statute on
interstate commerce is incidental and the Pike standard applies. Id.
74. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). In Hughes, the Court stated that the burden falls
on the state to demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local
purpose and that this purpose could not be served as well by non-discriminatory
alternatives. Id. at 336. For further discussion of the Pike Test and the Hughes
Test in dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see Lisa J. Petricone, The
Dormant Commerce Clause: A Sensible Standard of Review, 27 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 443, 451-52 (1987).
In National Ass'n of Fundraising Ticket Mfrs. v. Humphrey, 753 F. Supp.
1465 (D. Minn. 1990), the court differentiated the two tests as follows:
The analytic distinction between [the Hughes test] and the less
demanding Pike test is somewhat indistinct since both examine
burdens on commerce in light of local purposes and available
alternatives. It is apparent ... however, that a closer means-end
relationship is required of facially discriminatory regulation than
that which has only an incidental effect on interstate commerce.
Id. at 1467 n.2.
75. See generally Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (applying
current dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to a Maine statute prohibiting
importation of baitfish).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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B. Example of Modern Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
A recent federal district court opinion provides an excellent
example of modern dormant Commerce Clause analysis of gam-
bling-related statutes. In National Association of Fundraising
Ticket Manufacturers v. Humphrey,76 the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota considered a Commerce
Clause challenge to Minnesota statutes that required all pull-tab
tickets sold in Minnesota to be manufactured in Minnesota and
all tickets to bear markings "For Sale in Minnesota Only" or
"Manufactured in Minnesota For Sale in Minnesota Only." '77
The parties agreed that the in-state manufacturing requirement
was discriminatory on its face and was subject to heightened
scrutiny under the Hughes Test. 7 The State argued, however,
that requiring pull-tabs to be manufactured in Minnesota served
the legitimate state interest of ensuring the security and integrity
of pull-tab gambling by allowing close in-state monitoring of
the manufacturing processes and industry practices. 79 Based on
a newspaper report that the commissioner who proposed the
manufacturing requirement had announced Minnesota's interest
in bringing jobs to Minnesota by producing pull-tabs locally
rather than sending the money out of the state, the court
concluded that the state's purpose was discriminatory. 0
The State further argued that the manufacturing requirement
was necessary because the state did not have regulators who
could travel to all the sixteen states where the pull-tabs were
manufactured. The court noted, however, that the legislature
had just appropriated increased funding to the gambling au-
thority for additional personnel. Thus, the court held that the
manufacturing requirement was not necessary to achieve the
State's monitoring objectives and violated the Commerce Clause. 8'
76. 753 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Minn. 1990).
77. Humphrey, 753 F. Supp. at 1466. Pull-tab tickets are cards with
randomly selected symbols concealed by perforated pull-tabs. If the configu-
rations on the tabs match the revealed configurations, the player wins. See
Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58, 63 (Mo. 1994) (en banc)
(classifying pull-tab as a lottery).
78. Humphrey, 753 F. Supp at 1468-69.
79. Id. at 1469.
80. Id. at 1470-71. Courts are not limited to considering the purposes
enumerated in a statute to determine the true legislative intent of a statute.
Humphrey, 753 F. Supp. at 1471 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at
336; Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 476 n.2 (1981)
(Powell, J., concurring in part)). See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978) (deciding that a dispute about ultimate legislative
purpose need not be resolved for Commerce Clause analysis because "the evil
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends").
81. Humphrey, 753 F. Supp. at 1473.
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The court next analyzed the "For Sale in Minnesota Only"
labeling requirement. The court applied the Pike standard be-
cause the labelling requirement applied equally to pull-tabs man-
ufactured in Minnesota and those manufactured out of state. 82
The labeling requirement failed the Pike test, and thus violated
the Commerce Clause, because the state ignored less discrimi-
natory alternatives.83
III. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF RIVERBOAT
GAMBLING ACTS
A. Riverboat Gambling Acts Are Subject to Constitutional
Scrutiny
A threshold issue in analyzing riverboat gambling acts is
whether gambling laws are even subject to constitutional scru-
,tiny. One argument against constitutional analysis of gambling
laws, raised in Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism
Co. of Puerto Rico,s4 a case involving a First Amendment
challenge to a law prohibiting casinos from advertising to Puerto
Rico citizens, is that because gambling is generally regarded as
a vice, the power to suppress it belongs to the states. 85 From
82. Id. at 1474. Because the court found the statute applied evenhandedly
to tickets manufactured both in state and out of state, the court correctly
applied the Pike standard. See supra note 73. The court held the "Manufac-
tured in Minnesota For Sale in Minnesota Only" labeling requirement uncon-
stitutional because its validity was predicated on the constitutionality of the
in-state manufacturing requirement. Id. at 1473, n.4.
83. Id. at 1475. Specifically, the court noted the less discriminatory
alternative of omitting of the word "Only" from the labeling requirement
(because the pull-tabs would at least be marketable outside of Minnesota). Id.
Cf. Pic-A-State PA. Inc. v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. I:CV-93-0814, 1993
WL 325539 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993). The Pic-A-State court held that strict
regulations on out-of-state sale of state lottery tickets violates the dormant
Commerce Clause. Id. at *8. The court further found that purposes of
protecting against fraud and theft in gambling operations, specifically in lottery
ticket sales, could be achieved through less discriminatory alternatives such as
requiring sellers to demonstrate financial responsibility and security; requiring
sellers to have clear criminal records; requiring proof of sellers' good character;
requiring sellers to be experienced in lottery ticket sales; requiring that sellers
have fitness consistent with the public interests to sell tickets; and requiring
that lottery tickets are not sold at higher than the regulated price. Id. at *7.
The Humphrey court also cited "the obvious protectionist motives" behind
Minnesota's statutory scheme as a reason for finding a Commerce Clause
violation. 753 F. Supp. at 1475.
84. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
85. See, e.g., Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1905) (upholding,
against a constitutional challenge, a state statute making a building owner
who permits gambling on his premises liable to make good the loss sustained
there).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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this, states might argue that their power to allow or prohibit
gambling gives them the right to regulate legalized gambling in
any way they see fit. While the Supreme Court acknowledged
states' broad power to regulate gambling, state gambling laws,
like all other laws, are subject to constitutional constraints. 6
Consequently, riverboat gambling states should not have carte
blanche to discriminate against out-of-state operators on the
premise that states have no obligation to legalize riverboat
gambling.8 7
State gambling laws are subject to constitutional challenges
because states are unlikely to opt out of riverboat gambling
altogether. Constitutional restrictions of a state's powers do not
create "such a Hobson's Choice""8 for a state permitting an
activity, such as gambling, that it is not obligated to create.
Specifically, a state does not have to choose between having no
power to regulate the activity as it sees fit, or prohibiting the
activity. Because riverboat gambling is a lucrative industry, it is
86. 478 U.S. at 331-33. In Posadas, a hotel organization challenged Puerto
Rico legislation allowing casino gambling but prohibiting advertising of gam-
bling to the Puerto Rican public. Id. at 331-33. The hotel group argued that
once the government decided to permit gambling, it could not use speech
restrictions to regulate that activity. Id. at 346. The Court responded that it
is "precisely because [Puerto Rico] could have enacted a wholesale prohibition
of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take
the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand
through restrictions on advertising." Id.
Despite its seeming deference to Puerto Rico's police power, the Court
reviewed the advertising restriction under the First Amendment. Id. at 340
(citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Srv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980)). Thus, it is clear that while a state does not lose its power to
regulate gambling by permitting it, a state's regulations must comply with
constitutional standards. Nut cf. Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp. 750, 759-60
(D. Nev. 1988) ("Licensed gaming is a privilege conferred by the state ...
[It] is a matter reserved to the states within the meaning of the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 'Within this context, we find
no room for federally protected constitutional rights."' (quoting State v.
Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977)). Several state codes provide that a
riverboat gambling license is a revocable privilege granted by the state and
does not create a property right. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-6-17 (Burns Supp.
1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:502.B (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-
76-3(5) (Supp. 1993).
87. Cf. Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 516 (1841) (Baldwin,
J., dissenting) (arguing that although slave states could prohibit importing
slaves entirely, a slave state could not grant its own citizens a privilege it
denied to citizens of other states).
88. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (arguing the Commerce Clause should not be used to
force New Jersey to choose between prohibiting all landfill operations in the
state and accepting waste from all states if it chooses to permit some landfill
operations).
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unlikely that a state would overturn its decision to legalize
riverboat gambling simply because one of its regulations is found
unconstitutional. On the other hand, there may be some interests
considered so important by a state that a successful constitu-
tional challenge to a regulation promoting those interests would
cause the state legislature to repeal its legalization of riverboat
gambling. For the above reasons, this Note proceeds on the
presumption that riverboat gambling acts are subject to consti-
tutional scrutiny.
B. Riverboat Gambling is a Subject of Interstate Commerce
Before dormant Commerce Clause analysis may be applied,
a state must burden an activity that can be considered interstate
commerce.8 9 The existing riverboat gambling acts impede the
interstate traffic of riverboat casinos between legalized states. °
But is riverboat gambling a subject of interstate commerce?
The courts have broadly defined interstate commerce. Gibbons
v. Ogden9' broadened the legal definition of commerce beyond
merely the exchange of goods involving transportation from
place to place. 92 According to Chief Justice Marshall,
"[commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:
it is intercourse."" Marshall added that commerce includes
navigation, 94 not only because shipping often involves the move-
ment of goods, but also because shipping itself is a form of
gainful economic activity. 95 In Champion v. Ames, 96 the Court
held that because lottery tickets are subjects of traffic, they are
subjects of commerce.Y Illegal gambling equipment is recognized
as a subject of interstate commerce, 98 and a court has held that
a statute prohibiting the out-of-state manufacture of pull-tab
89. See New Orleans Steamship Ass'n v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor and
Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that substantial
burden on interstate commerce is a prerequisite for applying dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis).
90. See supra part L.A (discussing impediments to multistate licensing and
interstate operation of riverboat casinos).
91. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
92. 15A AM. JuiR. 2D Commerce § 3 (1976).
93. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189.
94. Id. at 190. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851).
95. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804,
812 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
96. 181 U.S. 321 (1903).
97. Id. at 354.
98. See, e.g., Stockton v. United States, 205 F. 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1913)(recognizing that even marked cards and loaded dice are lawful objects of
commerce).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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games violated the Commerce Clause.9 By combining the well-
settled understanding that navigation is commerce, and the cases
recognizing movement and manufacture of gambling equipment
as interstate commerce, it becomes clear that riverboat gambling
qualifies as interstate commerce. 1°° Therefore, impediments to
multistate operation of riverboat casinos burden interstate com-
merce.
C. System of Required Licenses Does Not Violate the
Commerce Clause
Riverboat casinos must be licensed by each state in which
they operate.' 0' If riverboat casinos could meet the licensing
requirements of more than one state, the fees required to obtain
licenses in more than one state would heavily burden multistate
operators.1°2 The requirement that an operator be licensed by
the state, however, does not discriminate against out-of-state
operators, either on its face or in its practical effect, because
the requirement applies evenhandedly. 03 Licensing fees are not
higher for out-of-state operators than for in-state operators.' °4
Furthermore, the burden of having to pay multiple states' li-
censing fees, although expensive, is merely an incidental burden
on interstate commerce.
The Pike v. Bruce Church standard applies to riverboat gam-
bling because the burden on interstate commerce is even-handed
and incidental. 0 5 Accordingly, the state licensing requirement
99. See supra part II.B.
100. Another argument supporting classification of riverboat gambling as
interstate commerce analogizes casino gambling to other forms of entertain-
ment that already qualify as interstate commerce. See, e.g., 15A Am. Jtn. 2D
Commerce § 4 (1976); 4 AM. JuR. 2D Amusements and Exhibitions § 13 (1962
& Supp. 1993) (interstate production and transportation of motion picture
films is interstate commerce, although actual showing of movies is only in
individual states; productions of stage performances can be interstate com-
merce; production of professional boxing events is interstate commerce, but
production of major league baseball games is not interstate commerce).
101. See supra note 14 (listing state licensing statutes).
102. See supra notes 20, 28-39 and accompanying text. A system for
calculating state taxes on gambling receipts from riverboat casinos operating
in multiple states is beyond the scope of this Note.
103. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that
evenhanded state regulations are valid unless they excessively burden interstate
commerce); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
443 (1960) (stating that evenhanded state regulation is permitted unless pre-
empted by federal law); see also supra note 73 (discussing Pike).
104. Cf. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 n.1, 336-37 (1979) (finding
a statutory licensing scheme charging $100 to residents and $300 to nonresidents
facially discriminatory).
105. For a discussion of Pike, see supra note 73 and accompanying text,
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does not violate the Commerce Clause unless the burden is
clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. The availability
of less discriminatory alternatives determines whether the burden
of a state licensing fee is excessive. States cannot reap the benefit
of the income generated by licensing fees through less discrim-
inatory alternatives if states limit the total number of licenses
issued to riverboat casinos. °6 Unless a reviewing court rejected
a state's strong interest in limiting the number of licensed
casinos, the court would sustain an even-handed license fee.
To demonstrate that a license requirement's burden on inter-
state commerce is not clearly excessive, consider three contiguous
states: A, B, and C. States A and B are riverboat gambling
states and state C is not. The burden on an operator licensed
in state A of having to pay additional licensing fees to state B
for the privilege of operating in both states is not excessive
because a state B operator would likewise have to pay additional
fees to state A to operate in both states.10 7 Furthermore, neither
state A nor state B operators would be able to operate in state
C's waters. In short, the burden on interstate commerce is not
clearly excessive because operators have to pay the same amount
for the same privileges. A state's license requirement, therefore,
does not violate the Commerce Clause. 0 8
D. Substantial Resources, Goods, and Services Requirements
Violate the Commerce Clause
Riverboat gambling acts commonly require that a substantial
amount of resources, goods, and services used in the operation
106. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 7(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(allowing only up to ten licenses to operate riverboat casinos); IND. CODE
ANN. § 4-33-6-1(a) (Bums Supp. 1994) (allowing a maximum of eleven licenses
at a time); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:525.A (West Supp. 1994) (allowing a
maximum of fifteen licenses); Mo. Rv. STAT. § 313.812.1 (Supp. 1993)
(allowing one license per city for first three years).
107. But see Pic-A-State PA., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A. No. l:CV-93-
0814, 1993 WL 325539, at *7 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993) (noting that the
Supreme Court does not recognize reciprocity agreements as an alternative to
improper discrimination against interstate commerce (citing New Energy Co.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-75 (1986)).
108. But see LAuREN E H. TRIBE, AMwRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 439 (2d
ed. 1988). A state may require out-of-state corporations to qualify as "foreign
corporation[s]" in order to do business within the state, typically involving
payment of a licensing fee, filing information with the state, and submitting
to the state's taxing jurisdiction as well as to in-state service of process. Id.
However, such a requirement may be unconstitutional when the corporation
''seeks to enter a state solely to engage in exclusively interstate commerce
there." Id. (citing Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 645 (1888); Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 56, 57 (1891)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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of riverboat casinos come from inside the state. Under Iowa's
act, riverboat operators must get a "substantial amount" of
goods, resources, services, and entertainment from within the
state.1' 9 Louisiana's act calls for operators to give "preferential
treatment . . . to Louisiana firms to the extent allowed by law"
when procuring goods and resources for their riverboats, and
when awarding contracts for services and entertainment.10 Mis-
sissippi requires operators to employ Mississippi residents as
gaming employees and other employees in the riverboat casino
operations "to the extent practicable." '' Missouri's riverboat
gambling act only requires the Missouri gaming commission to
"encourage" casino operators to use Missouri resources, goods,
and services.' 2
Some of these local preference statutes are more likely than
others to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Iowa and
Mississippi acts have the most stringent requirements because
they mandate the use of a substantial amount of state resources
or a substantial number of state residents as employees. The
Missouri act's "state resources" language, on the other hand,
is effectively precatory, and the Louisiana act claims that its
requirements only apply to the extent allowed by law, presum-
ably including Commerce Clause restrictions.' 3 Local preference
requirements like Iowa's are susceptible to Commerce Clause
challenges not only because they impede multistate licensing of
a riverboat casino, but also because they discriminate against
all out-of-state goods and job applicants.1 4
The Supreme Court has addressed Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to local preference requirements in employment. In White
v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,"5 the Court
upheld an executive order by the mayor of Boston requiring
that fifty percent of all construction work on any project funded
by the City of Boston be performed by Boston residents. The
109. IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.4 (West Supp. 1994). The Iowa act provides:
The commission shall require that an applicant utilize Iowa re-
sources, goods and services in the operation of an excursion
gambling boat. The commission shall... assure that a substantial
amount of all resources and goods used.., come from Iowa and
that a substantial amount of all services and entertainment be
provided by Iowans.
Id.
110. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:511(2)(g) (West Supp. 1994).
111. MIsS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-3(4) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
112. Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.812 (Supp. 1993). See supra note 31 (describing
repeal of more restrictive language).
113. For comparisons to Louisiana's exemption, see supra note 33.
114. See Powell, supra note 19, at 397.
115. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
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Court exempted the executive order from Commerce Clause
analysis because the city acted as a market participant and not
as a market regulator.1 6 Accordingly, if a state qualified as a
market participant in the riverboat gambling industry, the pro-
visions of the state act would qualify for the market participant
exception to the Commerce Clause." 7
It is difficult at times to discern whether a state is acting as
a market participant or as a market regulator."' In the case of
riverboat gambling, however, the state's role is clearly regula-
tory." 9 Economic benefits to the state from legalizing riverboat
gambling and the state's role in the licensing process are insuf-
ficient to justify applying the market participant exception.2 0
State resources, goods, and services requirements, such as
those in the Iowa act,' 2' violate the Commerce Clause under
dormant Commerce Clause analysis.'2 Although the require-
116. Id. at 210.
117. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 98-
99 (1984) (rejecting "the contention that a State's action as a market regulator
may be upheld against [a] Commerce Clause challenge on the ground that the
State could achieve the same end as a market participant"). Accord White,
460 U.S. at 214-15; Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
118. White, 460 U.S. at 217-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Reeves,
447 U.S. at 440).
119. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating
that the Riverboat Gambling Act was designed to strictly regulate gambling);
IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1-2 (Burns Supp. 1994) (stating that the statute was
designed to regulate); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:502.A(4) (West Supp. 1994)
(describing regulatory purposes); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-3 (1993) (describing
the state's interest in tight regulation of riverboat gambling to protect the
public's trust and confidence in the industry).
120. See White, 460 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The line between regulation and market participation, for purposes
of the Commerce Clause, should be drawn with reference to the
constitutional values giving rise to the market participant exemp-
tion itself.... The legitimacy of a claim to the market participant
exemption thus should turn primarily on whether a particular state
action more closely resembles an attempt to impede trade among
private parties, or an attempt ... to govern the State's own
economic conduct and to determine the parties with whom it will
deal.
Id.
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing Iowa's gambling
statute).
122. Cf. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 345 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing a state requirement that out-of-state businesses use state
resources in the course of their business for the benefit of the local economy
is a strong indication of a Commerce Clause violation). See also Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (finding a South Carolina statute requiring out-
of-state shrimpers to unload and pack their shrimp catch in South Carolinahttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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ments do not discriminate against interstate commerce on their
face, they discriminate in their practical effect and are subject
to heightened scrutiny under Hughes. The requirements violate
the Commerce Clause unless they serve legitimate local purposes
that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives.'2 The requirements serve legitimate local interests includ-
ing promoting the state's economy and reducing unemployment.
However, because nondiscriminatory alternative means exist to
achieve these ends, the requirements violate the Commerce
Clause. 12"
E. Historical Replica Requirements Violate the Commerce
Clause
Riverboat gambling acts also commonly require that a licensed
riverboat be designed as a replica of that state's nineteenth
century riverboats.12 Practically, this requirement only burdens
operators in states that do not have such 'historical replica'
requirements. Nineteenth century riverboats were built to meet
demands for interstate transportation of goods, people, and
livestock. 26 The nineteenth century riverboats of all states looked
similar,'27 so meeting one state's replica requirement should
satisfy the replica requirements of other riverboat gambling
before transporting out of state violated the Commerce Clause); Foster-
Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (finding Louisiana's
statute requiring that shrimps be shelled in the state before being shipped out
of state violated the Commerce Clause); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16
(1928) (finding Louisiana's prohibition on out-of-state shipments of oysters
violated the Commerce Clause).
123. See supra text accompanying note 75 (stating step three of dormant
Commerce Clause analysis).
124. See White, 460 U.S. at 225 (Blackmun, J. Dissenting) (enumerating
nondiscriminatory alternatives to local preference requirements in employment
including, inter alia, creating training programs for unemployed residents).
125. See supra note 34 (listing state historical replica requirements).
126. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 194 (discussing the
competitiveness of the riverboat industry and the importance of Robert Ful-
ton's invention of the steamboat for interstate shipping); Powell, supra note
19, at 395 (explaining that most of the glamour of nineteenth century river-
boating is merely folklore because riverboats, only in wide use from 1835-
1865, were an unpleasant form of transportation and quickly replaced by
railroads). See generally WnmLu J. PETERSEN, STEAMBOATiNG ON THE UPPER
Mississippi, 381-90 (1968) (describing cargoes of nineteenth century steam-
boats); MILDRED L. HARTSOUoH, FRoM CANOE TO STEEL BARGE ON THE UPPER
Mississippi, 41-47 (1934) (detailing the historical development of the riverboat
industry).
127. See, e.g., PETERSEN, supra note 126, illus. 17 (illustrating Robert
Fulton's steamboat, the Clermont, and Nicholas J. Roosevelt's steamboat, the
New Orleans).
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states . 28  Historical replica requirements apply evenhandedly to
both in-state and out-of-state operators. Thus, any burden placed
on interstate commerce by the replica requirements is merely
incidental, and the Pike standard applies for dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 12  Without a replica requirement, an operator
only has limited incentives to make a riverboat casino with a
historical design. But an operator might do so simply in order
to comply with other states' requirements or to sway sentiments
in a municipality voting on whether to permit the riverboat
casino . 130
The purposes behind historical replica requirements include
the promotion of state tourism and the beautification of river-
banks.13 1 It is unclear whether these purposes are legitimate
under dormant Commerce Clause analysis in light of the ultimate
economic interests behind riverboat gambling acts. Also, there
are less discriminatory alternatives to promoting state tourism
and achieving riverfront beautification, such as advertising and
allowing aesthetic, modern-looking casino cruise ship designs in
addition to historical replicas. 32 In light of states' economic
motives and these less discriminatory alternatives, Step 2 of the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis discussed in Part II pre-
sumes the burden on interstate commerce from the replica
requirements to be high. Under the Pike standard, the historical
replica requirements are clearly excessive in relation to the
purported purposes of promoting local tourism and beautifica-
tion, and thus violate the Commerce Clause.
128. Riverboat gambling states have different design requirements that may
still prevent interstate licensing of riverboat casinos, despite operators meeting
historical replica requirements. See IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.5.a (West Supp.
1994) (limiting gambling area on riverboats to thirty percent of square footage);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:504(23)(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining riverboats
as vessels having a minimum length of one hundred fifty feet).
129. See supra note 73 (describing the Pike standard).
130. Most riverboat gambling statutes require some form of local approval
before an operator may receive a license. See ILx. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para.
10 § 7(j) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (requiring local approval before the Gaming Board
may authorize riverboat docking); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-6-18(b) (Burns
Supp. 1994) (same); IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.7.10(a) (West Supp. 1994)
(requiring local approval to conduct gambling on a boat); Mo. Rnv. STAT.
§ 313.812.10 (Supp. 1993) (requiring city approval for docking rights). But see
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:552.C(l)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring a petition
signed by 25% of registered voters in a municipality in order to call an election
to prohibit riverboat gambling in that municipality).
131. See supra note 19 (discussing state legislative justifications for legali-
zation of riverboat gambling).
132. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 6(f) (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(permitting casino cruise ship designs as well as replicas of nineteenth century
Illinois riverboats).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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F. Supplier's License Requirements Do Not Violate the
Commerce Clause
The existing riverboat gambling acts require operators to
acquire all their gambling equipment through state-licensed sup-
pliers.' Illinois requires suppliers to file annual inventories and
keep careful records of gambling equipment sales, and requires
suppliers to permanently affix their name to all equipment,
devices, and supplies used in gambling operations. 3 4 Iowa re-
quires suppliers to have representatives in the state to take
delivery of gambling equipment before delivery to operators. 35
Unlike the labeling requirements in National Association of
Fundraising Ticket Manufacturers. v. Humphrey, 3 6 the sup-
plier's license requirements of the riverboat gambling acts do
not impose burdens that interfere with suppliers selling gambling
equipment in other states. 37
Supplier's license requirements might burden interstate com-
merce by charging suppliers cumulative license fees if they sell
gambling equipment to casinos operating in multiple states. This
is an incidental burden and survives scrutiny under the Pike
standard of dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 13 8 The burden
is not clearly excessive in relation to the state's purpose: Main-
taining confidence and trust in the riverboat gambling industry
by licensing and regulating operators, manufacturers, and dis-
tributors.
133. Supra note 35 and accompanying text. States also charge fees for
supplier's licenses. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 8(a) (Smith-Hurd
1993) (requiring an application fee to be set by state gaining board and a
$5,000 annual license fee); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-7-1(B), (C) (Burns Supp.
1994) (requiring an application fee set by the state gaming commission and a
$5,000 annual license fee); IowA CcODE ANN. § 99F.17.1 (West Supp. 1994)
(requiring a $1,000 annual license fee for distributors and a $250 annual
license fee for manufacturers); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:550.A(1), (2), (3)
(West Supp. 1994) (charging $5,000 annual license fee for manufacturers of
slot machines; $2,500 annual license fee for manufacturers of other gambling
devices or equipment; $1,500 annual license fee for suppliers of gaming devices
or equipment); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-79(4)(a), (b) (1993) (requiring $1,000
annual license fee for manufacturers; $500 annual license fee for suppliers);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.807.3 (Supp. 1993) (requiring application fee and annual
license fee in an amount to be set by state gaming commission).
134. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230 para. 10 § 8(e) (Smith-Hurd 1993). Indiana
and Louisiana have similar requirements. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-7-5 (Bums
Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:541.E (West Supp. 1994).
135. IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.17.5 (West Supp. 1994).
136. 753 F. Supp. 1465 (D. Minn. 1990). See supra text accompanying note
77 (state required all pull-tab tickets be labelled "For Sale in Minnesota
Only").
137. See Humphrey, 753 F. Supp. at 1473-75.
138. See supra note 73 (discussing Pike).
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On the other hand, cumulative licensing of suppliers is un-
necessary. Manufacturers can be sufficiently regulated by single
states at the point gambling equipment is initially put into the
stream of commerce, and distributors can be regulated by states
at the points of sale, delivery, and service of gambling equip-
ment. In short, supplier's license requirements do not violate
the commerce clause, but if multistate operation of riverboat
casinos becomes feasible, cumulative licensing of suppliers would
no longer be necessary.
G. Other Impediments to Multistate Operation of Riverboat
Casinos Do Not Violate the Commerce Clause
In summary, a state's requirement that riverboat gambling
operations be licensed does not violate the Commerce Clause;
local goods, services, and resources requirements in riverboat
gambling acts violate the Commerce Clause; historical replica
requirements may violate the Commerce Clause; and supplier's
license requirements would only violate the Commerce Clause
to the extent they interfere with suppliers' ability to sell gambling
equipment to operators in multiple states.
Several other inconsistencies among the existing riverboat
gambling acts either impede multistate licensing or interfere with
interstate operation of riverboat casinos."' A riverboat casino
licensed in both Illinois and Iowa could not, for example, move
from Iowa waters, where the minimum gambling age is eight-
een, 140 into Illinois waters, where the minimum gambling age is
twenty-one,' 4' if there are gambling patrons on board between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, unless these patrons were
suddenly removed from the gambling area when the riverboat
crossed the state border. The same riverboat casino could not
allow wagers above five dollars per hand or losses of over two
hundred dollars for a single gambling excursion in Iowa,142 but
Illinois has no such wager or loss limits. 43 Perhaps the casino
tables could change stakes on gambling games depending on the
riverboat's location. However, even an excursion that began and
ended in Illinois would technically have to comply with Iowa's
maximum loss requirement if the riverboat crossed into' Iowa
waters at any time. In addition, states adopt different pay-out
139. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
140. IowA CODE ANN. § 99F.9.6 (West Supp. 1994).
141. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 1l(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
142. IowA CODE ANN. §§ 99F.4.4, 99F.9.2 (West Supp. 1994).
143. See ILL. Am. STAT. 10 § 5(b)(11) (giving the Illinois Gaming Board a
year to recommend to the Governor "whether limits on wagering losses should
be imposed").https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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rates for gambling games such as slot machines.'" A casino
operator is unlikely to be able to reset the pay-out rates of all
gambling games in the casino upon cossing into a different
state's waters.
These inconsistencies merely illustrate some of the regulations
in existing riverboat gambling acts that interfere with interstate
riverboat casinos.145 Because operators seeking licenses in mul-
tiple states must comply with the most stringent requirements
of all states in which they operate, the option of challenging
the statutory inconsistencies as violating the Commerce Clause1 "
144. IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4.15, .16 (West Supp. 1994) (delegating to the
state racing and gaming commission the power to determine pay-out rates for
slot machines and other gambling games); Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.805(12)
(Supp. 1993) (requiring pay-outs on all gambling games to be at least eighty
percent of all wagers).
145. Another major and volatile inconsistency is allowance of dock-side
gambling. Compare ILL. STAT. ANN. 10 § 1l(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (prohib-
iting dock-side gambling) with Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 313.805(15) (allowing dock-
side gambling if vessel is continuously docked at certain locations). But see
Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58, 66 (Mo. 1994) (requiring
state to show a substantial justification for the special exemption from the
cruising requirement).
See also supra note 37 (listing dock-side gambling provisions of riverboat
gambling acts); Op. Att'y Gen. 91 (Miss. July 29, 1991) (interpreting a
provision of Mississippi's gaming control act requiring vessels to comply with
U.S. Coast Guard criteria for cruise vessels in order to receive gambling
licenses, together with the legislative history of Mississippi's gaming act, to
possibly prohibit permanently moored vessels from obtaining licenses, and
thus potentially prohibit dock-side gambling). But see Op. Att'y Gen. 91 (Miss.
Sept. 24, 1991) (recognizing legal dock-side gambling in Mississippi only where
expressly approved by voters).
Operators desire dock-side gambling privileges for several reasons. First,
operation costs of dock-side gambling are less expensive. Second, dock-side
gambling may attract more patrons who are dissuaded by the length of the
off-shore excursions. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § l1(a)(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (cruises may not exceed four hours, except for expressly approved
extended excursions); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-9-3 (Bums Supp. 1994) (limiting
maximum excursion to four hours, with the exception of expressly approved
extended cruises); IOWA CODE AN. § 99F.4.17 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring
the Iowa racing and gaming commission to set the duration of gambling
excursions at a minimum of three hours during the excursion season); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:525.B(2) (West Supp. 1994) (requiring cruises to be
between three and eight hours in duration, except for expressly approved
extended excursions). Finally, some potential gamblers may simply be afraid
of the water. See Transcript of debate on Illinois Senate Bill 572, H.R. 108
(June 22, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stephens) (criticizing legalized gambling
on riverboats with a slippery-slope argument that some day a "land lover"
will bring a successful constitutional challenge to the distinction between
gambling in boats and gambling on dry land and the result will be legalized
gambling throughout Illinois).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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seems attractive. Mere lack of uniformity among state regula-
tions, however, is not grounds for finding a Commerce Clause
violation.147
Minimum age, maximum wagers, loss limits, standardized pay-
out rates, and similar requirements are much less likely to fail
scrutiny under dormant Commerce Clause analysis than those
requirements discussed previously. The state's police power played
an important role throughout the development of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. 148 When states legalized riverboat
gambling, they did so with a careful eye toward the evils
associated with gambling. Required age limits, wager and loss
limits, and minimum pay-out rates for slot machines and other
games were legislative concessions that arguably made legalized
riverboat gambling possible in those states. Such requirements
provided legislators and voters with the assurances they needed
to approve the gambling acts.
If the power to enact even these fundamental protections into
riverboat gambling acts is undermined by the dormant Com-
merce Clause, or any other constitutional doctrine, states would
be put much closer to what Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to
as a "Hobson's Choice.' ' 49 This small category of regulations
protect such important in-state interests that, without the regu-
lations, many states would forseeably choose not to legalize
gambling at all. Iowa's excursion boat gambling provisions, for
example, are codified among Iowa's "police powers" statutes.'5
This placement is indicative of the local nature of legalized
gambling. The federal government and courts should not second-
guess state legislatures or try to hypothesize less discriminatory
147. See Specialized Carriers & Rigging Ass'n v. Virginia, 795 F.2d 1152,
1160 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent
federal entry into the field.") (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959)). Specialized Carriers ruled that a state's requirement
for flashing lights on oversize trucks did not violate the Commerce Clause,
despite fact that the requirement was more stringent than other states' laws,
because the purpose of the statute was to promote highway safety. However,
the Court grants special deference to regulations concerning highway safety.
Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978) (stating
that a challenge to a state regulation said to promote highway safety must
overcome a "strong presumption of ... validity" (quoting Bibb, 359 U.S.
at 524)).
148. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
the police power through the Taney Court Era and beyond).
149. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 631 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Commerce Clause might require a state to face absurd alternatives).
150. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 80-122B (1984).
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alternatives to local matters such as determining when citizens
are mature enough to gamble responsibly and determining what
protections may be necessary to keep gambling from causing
serious economic injury to patrons.'51
IV. PROPOSED MODEL RIVERBOAT GAMBLING ACT"12
The following proposal for a Model Riverboat Gambling Act
is modeled after the six riverboat gambling acts discussed in this
Note, with improvements based on the dormant Commerce
Clause findings in Part III. Like existing acts, the goals of the
Model Act are to promote in-state economic interests and pro-
vide sufficient regulatory protections. The Model Act, however,
achieves these goals without discriminating against out-of-state
operators. By considering out-of-state operators and interstate
movement of riverboat casinos when drafting a riverboat gam-
bling act, a state can avoid dormant Commerce Clause review
of its statutory scheme for legalizing the lucrative riverboat
gambling industry.
§ [1] Short Title. This Act shall be entitled the [State] Riv-
erboat Gambling Act.
§ [2] Purpose. This Act is intended to promote [State's]
economic development by legalizing gambling on riverboats. In
order to maintain the public's confidence and trust in the
riverboat gambling industry, this Act provides strict licensing
requirements, strict regulatory provisions, and comprehensive
law enforcement for all riverboat gambling operations. 15 3
§ [3] Definitions.
[(a)] "Adjusted gross receipts" means the total sums wagered
on the riverboat, less winnings paid out to wagerers.154
[(b)] "Cheat" means to alter the selection of criteria that
determine the result of a gambling game or the amount or
frequency of payment in a gambling game. This includes altering
bets after the time in which bets must be placed, altering the
outcome of a game by use of fraud, trickery, deceit, or device,
151. Compare Specialized Carriers & Rigging Assoc., 795 F.2d at 1160
(leaving policy decisions in the area of highway safety to states).
152. State legislatures have debated the issue of whether to adopt riverboat
gambling acts of other states. See, e.g., Transcript of debate on Illinois Senate
Bill 572, H.R. 95 (June 22, 1989) (statements of Reps. Sieben and Giorgi).
States drafting riverboat gambling legislation should take local considerations
into account to determine what additional provisions to add to their riverboat
gambling acts, taking care not to discriminate against out-of-state riverboat
casino operators.
153. See supra note 119 (citing statutes that assert regulatory purposes).
154. Adapted from IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.I.1, .11 (West Supp. 1994).
See supra note 21 (discussing definitions of "adjusted gross receipts").
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or otherwise utilizing methods designed to beat the odds on a
particular game by, for example, counting cards.'
[(e)] "Compulsive gambler" means any person who is chron-
ically and progressively preoccupied with gambling and the urge
to gamble. 156 A person may still be a compulsive gambler despite
never or rarely losing money while gambling.
[(d)] "Dock" means any location where a riverboat moors
for the purpose of embarking and disembarking passengers." 7
[(e)] "Gambling" or "gaming" means an agreement between
persons to risk money, converted to tokens, chips, or electronic
cards, in a contest of chance in which one may be the winner
and the other the loser. 58
[(f)] "Gambling game" or "gaming activity" includes [bac-
carat, twenty-one, poker, craps, slot machine, video poker,
roulette wheel, punchboard, pull-tab]. 15 9
[(g)] "Home dock" means a designated location within this
state reserved for a riverboat casino for mooring for any reason
while on an excursion within this state.
[(h)] "Operator" or "licensee" means a person or persons,
including natural persons, corporations (foreign or domestic),
sole proprietorships, partnerships (including limited partner-
ships), firms, fiduciaries, trusts, or other business entities, li-
censed under this act to operate a riverboat casino in this state.
160
[(i)] "Riverboat casino" means a self-propelled vessel on
which lawful gambling is permitted under the provisions of this
act.'6'
155. Adapted from ILL. Ar. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 4(i) (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-2-4 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 99F.1.3 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:664 (West Supp.
1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-5(11) (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.800(3)
(Supp. 1993).
156. Adapted from Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.842 (Supp. 1993).
157. Adapted from ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 4(f) (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-2-7 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 99F.I.6 (West Supp. 1994).
158. See generally 38 AM. JuR. 2D Gambling § 1 (1968) (discussing defini-
tions of gambling).
159. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 4(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-33-2-9 (Bums Supp. 1994). Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.1.10
(West Supp. 1994) (defining "gambling game" as "any game of chance
authorized by the [state racing and gaming] commission"); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 4:504(10) (West Supp. 1994).
160. Adapted from IND. CODE ANN. §§ 4-33-2-12, -16 (Burns Supp. 1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.1.13 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:504
(13) (West Supp. 1994) (including persons "applying for a gaming license to
conduct gaming activities"); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-5(t), (aa) (1993); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 313.800(11) (Supp. 1993).
161. Adapted from ILL. Am. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 4(d) (Smith-Hurdhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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[0)] "Supplier" means a distributor, seller, lessor, or manu-
facturer of gambling equipment licensed and regulated by a
riverboat gambling state.162
§ [4] Wager / Loss Limits. The maximum wager on any
gambling game is [$10]. The maximum amount a player can
lose on a gambling excursion is [$500] .163
§ [5] Age Limits. A person must be at least [18] years old to
enter the gambling facility of a riverboat casino, and must be
at least [21] years old to make a wager. Employees must be at
least [18 years old, but may not be employed as a dealer or
accept wagers on gambling games unless at least 21 years old].'6
§ [6] Pay-out Rates. All gambling games shall be set to pay
out at a rate of [eighty] percent of all wagers. 165
§ [7] Licensing Requirement. An operator must be licensed
by this state to operate a riverboat casino anywhere within this
state.'"6
[(a)] Qualifications. To qualify for a riverboat gambling li-
cense, an operator must meet the following requirements:
[(1)] Fees. The operator must pay a licensing fee of [$50,000]
for the first year and a renewal fee of [$10,000] per year
thereafter. 167
[(2)] Investigation. An applicant must submit to a [four month]
investigation by this state's [licensing authority / state gaming
commission] including close examination of the applicant's fi-
nancial responsibility, criminal record, character, and fitness to
operate a riverboat casino consistent with the public interest.
The applicant must also be able to demonstrate financial security
and to project the extent of riverboat cruises in this state's
waters.,'"
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-2-17 (Burns Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 99F.1.7 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:504(23) (West 1992);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 27-109-1, 75-76-5(ii) (1993). But see Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 313.800(6) (Supp. 1993). In Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d
58, 66 (Mo. 1994) (en banc), however, the Missouri Supreme Court demanded
a substantial justification for the state's exemption to the cruising requirement.
See also supra note 37 (discussing Missouri's cruising exemption).
162. Adapted from ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230, para. 10 § 8 (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-33-2-18 (Burns Supp. 1994); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 99F.1.14 (West Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:541 (West Supp.
1994); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-76-5(w), 75-76-79 (1993); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 313.800(12) (Supp. 1993).
163. See supra note 36 (citing statutory wager and loss limits).
164. See supra note 38 (citing statutory age restrictions).
165. Adapted from Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.805(12) (Supp. 1993).
166. See supra note 14 (discussing statutory licensing requirements).
167. See supra note 20 (listing state license fees).
168. See supra note 83 (discussing less-discriminatory alternatives for effec-
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[(b)] Licenses are subject to revocation for violation of any
state riverboat gambling act.
§ [8] Limited Out-of-State Operator Licenses. Out-of-state
riverboat casino operators are eligible for limited licenses. Under
a limited license, operation of riverboat gambling in this state's
waters is allowed, subject to the same license fees as in-state
operators. However, no taxes on wagers or admissions charges
will be assessed on limited licensees. No dock-side gambling is
allowed in this state on limited-licensed riverboat casinos. 69
§ [9] Law Enforcement. All riverboat casinos licensed under
this Act shall be subject to boarding and searches by law
enforcement personnel of this state, members of the [licensing
authority / state gaming commission], and by the U.S. Coast
Guard.
[§ [10] Declaration of State's Exemption from Operation of
Provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1172. Anywhere within this state that
gambling is authorized in accordance with this act is exempt
from the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1172, the federal act pro-
hibiting the interstate transportation of gambling devices.]' 70
§ [11] Riverboat Design. The State has interests in beautifying
its riverbanks, promoting tourism, ensuring that, while docked,
riverboat casinos do not give false appearances of being gam-
bling venues in permanent structures, and preventing gambling
on floating barges merely to comply with the vessel requirement
of § [3(i)] of this act. Therefore, riverboat casinos that are
replicas of nineteenth century passenger steamboats or riverboats
with modern casino cruise ship designs are given preference in
licensing. 171
§ [12] Compulsive Gamblers Fund. An outpatient center shall
be established to provide services for compulsive gamblers and
their families in any city or county that licenses riverboat casinos.
The centers shall be financed by a percentage of the state income
from riverboat gambling license fees, admissions fees, and wa-
gering taxes, to be set by the [licensing authority / state gaming
tively regulating interstate gambling operations in a manner that could protect
the public from evils sometimes associated with gambling operations, such as
theft and fraud, suggested in Pic-A-State PA., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, Civ. A.
No. 1:CV-93-0814, 1993 WL 325539, at *7, *8 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993)).
169. This section attempts to alleviate current barriers to multi-state licensing
of riverboat casinos. See supra part I.A (listing impediments to multi-state
licensing).
170. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing federal penalty
for interstate transportion of gambling equipment, 15 U.S.C. § 1172 (Supp.
V 1993), and lack of necessity of state waiver of § 1172).
171. See supra part III.E (arguing that strict historical replica requirements
violate the Commerce Clause).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol47/iss1/4
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commission] and deposited into the compulsive gamblers' fund. 72
§ [131 Excluded Persons. There shall be a list of persons who
are to be excluded or ejected from any licensed riverboat casino.
The list may include any person who has previously violated
this act, has engaged in cheating as defined by § [3(b)] of this
act, has been convicted of a felony involving organized crime
or racketeering, or who is a recovering compulsive gambler and
has requested that his or her name be added to the list.173
§ [14] Maximum Number of Licenses. The [licensing authority
/ state gaming commission] may issue up to [15] operator's
licenses and an unlimited number of limited out-of-state oper-
ator's licenses.17 4
§ [15] Supplier's Licenses. A supplier shall furnish a list of
any gambling equipment and supplies offered for sale or lease
to state-licensed operators. A supplier shall keep books and
records for the furnishing of gambling equipment separate from
other records and shall permanently affix its name to all its
gambling devices, equipment, and supplies for riverboat casi-
nos. 17 A supplier of gambling equipment to a limited out-of-
state licensee need not be licensed under this provision, unless
called upon to service gambling equipment on a riverboat in
this state's waters. 76
§ [16] Cashless Wagering System. All wagers must be made
using tokens, chips, or electronic cards. Such tokens, chips, or
electronic cards must be purchased or encoded by the operator
either aboard the riverboat or at an approved on-shore facility.177
§ [17] Presence Requirement. "Wagers may be received only
from a person present on a licensed riverboat. A person present
on a licensed riverboat may not place or attempt-to place a
wager on behalf of another person who is not present on the
riverboat."' 78
Jeremy Robert Kriegel*
172. Adapted from Mo. REv. STAT. § 313.842 (Supp. 1993).
173. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:520 (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-76-
35 (Supp. 1993).
174. See supra note 106 (listing state limits on the number of licenses).
175. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:541.E (West Supp. 1994).
176. See supra part III.F (discussing supplier's license requirements).
177. Adapated from ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 230 para. 10 § 11(a)(9), (12)
(Smith-Hurd 1993).
178. IND. CODE Ar. § 4-33-9-10 (Burns Supp. 1994).
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